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Animals and Causal Impotence: 
A Deontological View
ABSTRACT
In animal ethics, moral philosophers like Peter Singer and Mylan 
Engel, Jr. argue that we ought not to purchase or consume animal 
products because doing so contributes causally to unnecessary suf-
fering. Others, such as Russ Shafer-Landau, counter that where such 
unnecessary suffering is not causally dependent on one’s causal con-
tributions, there is no duty to refrain from purchasing animal prod-
ucts, even if the process by which those products are produced is 
morally abhorrent. I argue that there are at least two plausible prin-
ciples which ground the wrongness of purchasing animal products 
produced by morally abhorrent means. First, respect for the wishes 
and dignity of animals who have been wrongly tortured and killed 
requires treating their losses as losses, which entails a pro tanto duty 
to refrain from using their bodies in ways to which they would not 
consent. Second, we ought to refrain from rewarding wrongdoing, 
which we fail to do when we purchase or consume immorally pro-
duced animal products.
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I. Introduction
A central concern of animal ethics is whether there is some 
duty to abstain from consuming meat and animal products. It is 
also of concern why such abstention is obligatory, if it is. Peter 
Singer holds that it is obligatory on utilitarian grounds:
I am a utilitarian. I am also a vegetarian. I am a veg-
etarian because I am a utilitarian. I believe that apply-
ing the principle of utility to our present situation–es-
pecially the methods now used to rear animals for food 
and the variety of food available to us–leads to the con-
clusion that we ought to be vegetarian. (1980, 332-334)1
That Singer is a vegetarian because he is a utilitarian is not 
initially surprising. Mylan Engel, Jr. (2000) makes this connec-
tion explicit2:
Engel’s Basic Argument
1. It is wrong to cause unnecessary suffering.
2.  Meat-eating, along with purchasing meat, causes 
unnecessary suffering.
 ∴  Therefore, meat-eating, along with purchasing 
meat, is wrong.
On Engel’s view, eating meat is wrong because of its causal 
consequences. Despite the prima facie power of Engel’s argu-
ment, some have challenged the assumption that utilitarianism 
in fact grounds normative vegetarianism. For example, Russ 
Shafer-Landau:
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The argument is very simple: one cannot, in one’s pur-
chase and eating of meat, have any direct influence on 
the amount of cruelty and harm inflicted on the ani-
mals in a factory farm. [...] The ordinary consumer of 
meat is so remote in the causal nexus of animal suffer-
ing, that one cannot properly attribute to any such con-
sumer any causal, hence moral, responsibility for the 
admittedly wretched fates suffered by farm animals. 
One is morally free to do as one likes so long as one 
does no harm. Meat purchases do no harm. Therefore 
one is morally free to make them. (1994, 85)
Engel’s arguments are explicitly criticized by Nathan Nobis:
But if an individual’s purchases have no causal influ-
ence on the plight of animals, then many of Engel’s 
entailments do not hold because, for the most part, an 
individual’s not buying and eating meat and other ani-
mal products will not result in less pain, suffering, and 
death for animals or any less environmental degrada-
tion. Even if Engel is correct that a minimally decent 
individual “would take steps to reduce the amount of 
unnecessary pain and suffering in the world, if s/he 
could do so with very little effort on his/her part,” since 
an individual’s meat-abstention can’t do anything to 
make the world a better place, at least not for animals, 
as Engel seems to suggest, his argument does not suc-
ceed. (2002, 145-146)
Finally, there is Alastair Norcross’s restatement of the prob-
lem:
[I]f I did not buy and consume factory-raised meat, no 
animals would be spared lives of misery. Agribusiness 
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is much too large to respond to the behavior of one 
consumer. Therefore I cannot prevent the suffering of 
any animals. I may well regret the suffering inflicted 
on animals for the sake of human enjoyment. I may 
even agree that the human enjoyment doesn’t justify 
the suffering. However, since the animals will suffer 
no matter what I do, I may as well enjoy the taste of 
their flesh. (2004, 231)
Call this argument the Causal Impotence Argument. The 
argument consists of two basic parts. The first is empirical: 
purchasing or eating meat makes no causal difference to the 
amount of unnecessary suffering in the world. This is because 
“[i]t is very likely that, in most cases, uncoordinated individual 
consumer meat purchases will not increase the number of ani-
mals bred, reared intensively, and subsequently killed on fac-
tory farms” (Chartier 2006, 233). The second is that because 
eating or purchasing meat will make no causal difference to the 
amount or degree of unnecessary suffering in the world, hardly 
any meat-eaters or meat-purchasers are doing wrong. Yet this, 
as Nobis observes, is precisely what Engel (and Singer) believe 
is wrong with most non-vegetarians.
The problem is not restricted to utilitarians3, however, as 
Shafer-Landau makes explicit when he writes, “Those who 
hope for a stronger, more reliable justification for the obligation 
to refrain from carnivorism may turn to deontology” (1994, 
92). Deontology is a view in ethical theory according to which 
an act’s deontic properties, like permissibility or impermissi-
bility, are not uniquely fixed by the consequences of that act (as 
in consequentialism) or by the effects it has upon the actor’s 
character (as in virtue ethics). There are a number of deontolo-
gists, or at least non-utilitarians, who regard vegetarianism as 
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morally obligatory. Tom Regan (2014, 95-108) holds that non-
human animals have rights which entail that meat-eating and 
meat-purchasing is wrong. No animal’s rights are violated by 
the mere consumer of meat. Thus Shafer-Landau:
If animals have rights at all, it is the factory farmer 
and slaughterer who violate them. I might put the point 
crudely. An animal is either dead or alive. If dead, it 
hasn’t any rights, so one’s purchase does not violate its 
rights. If alive, the animal may be mistreated, but by 
the farmer, not the ordinary consumer. So a purchase 
does not violate the rights of the animal purchased. 
(1994, 93)
I shall argue that it is pro tanto wrong either to purchase or 
consume animal products, under the assumption that the pro-
cess by which they were made was morally wrong. That such 
a process is deeply immoral is not denied by Shafer-Landau 
(1994, 96-98) or any of those who press the Causal Impotence 
Argument, and is in fact affirmed, if only tentatively. Indeed, 
the claim is that it is permissible to purchase these products 
even if they were produced immorally. By offering arguments 
demonstrating the wrongness of purchasing or consuming im-
morally produced animal products, therefore, I undermine the 
Causal Impotence Argument. 
I offer two arguments against purchasing or consuming im-
morally produced animal products. First, doing so fails to treat 
moral losses as moral losses, wrongs as wrongs, and thereby 
fails to show minimally required respect for violated rights. 
Second, doing so rewards prior wrongdoing, which is likewise 
wrong. Lastly, my arguments will extend not only to purchas-
ing and eating animal flesh, but also to whatever animal prod-
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ucts are produced immorally. My arguments therefore remain 
neutral between, for example, ethical vegetarianism and ethical 
veganism, or between animal welfarism and animal abolition-
ism. They merely show that it is pro tanto wrong to purchase 
animal products produced immorally, no matter what those 
products may be.
II. The First Argument: Treating Losses as Loss-
es
If I have rights, they ought to be respected. This entails at 
least two things, the first of which is that my rights ought to be 
respected in the sense that their content ought to be abided by. 
Thus, if I have a right not to be unjustly harmed, then you ought 
not to harm me unjustly; and if I have a right not to be lied to, 
then you ought not to lie to me. The second entailment, and the 
one which shall concern us here, is that my rights ought to be 
respected in the sense that a moral loss to me should be treated 
by you as a moral loss.
What does it mean to say that we ought to treat moral losses 
as moral losses? The requirement is simply this: when some-
thing morally bad occurs, one acts permissibly only if one 
treats that occurrence as if it were bad, not to be admired, tak-
en advantage of, or participated in insofar as doing so can be 
reasonably avoided. More specifically, where doing so can be 
reasonably avoided, we ought not to perform acts the participa-
tion in which would complete (or otherwise complement) the 
intended purpose of a wrongdoing. To illustrate, consider the 
following example.
Suppose the individual who violated your rights did so for 
some purpose, p, and that, if the individual had not wronged 
you, he would not have accomplished p. In addition, suppose 
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that accomplishing p requires not only your removal, but also 
a wrongful use of you. The Corpse Review, now under new 
leadership, comes to Los Angeles. Preserved human corpses 
and their parts are displayed throughout the museum. Schools 
usher students in to learn anatomy in a tactile way. An expose 
in the Los Angeles Times reveals that these corpses were not 
voluntarily donated, that in fact those to whom the corpses 
formerly belonged were selected and murdered by those now 
running the museum. These people, moreover, were in general 
not sick or otherwise less well off than the average individual. 
They were at the prime of their lives. Still others were sick 
or dead, but not did volunteer their bodies for exhibition. The 
owners’ purpose, moreover, was to acquire and display bodies 
which were not provided voluntarily.
While it was illegal to murder these persons or steal their 
corpses, the laws surrounding the new Corpse Review are in 
limbo as attorneys have appealed the decision to shut down 
the exhibit. However, despite the legal complexities, visitors 
(including paying visitors) are at absolutely no risk of legal ac-
tion against them. You are offered the opportunity to purchase 
a ticket.
Killing these people and stealing their corpses is not merely 
contingently required to create the new Corpse Review, as if 
your body resembled a dinosaur and they used it temporarily. 
Rather, creating the Corpse Review is, in a real sense, bound 
up in, or about, killing you  or wrongfully using you (or both). 
Attending the exhibit is just to use the corpses in a way that 
continues a history of purposeful exploitation, as you know the 
corpses are being wrongfully used but decide to use (albeit in a 
different way) them regardless.
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Consider five other examples. In the first case, I have the 
opportunity to purchase a walking stick from a vender who, as 
I know, stole it from a homeless person. I make the purchase. 
In another example, I steal a stapler from a friend and bring it 
home to my partner. She knows I stole it but decides to use it 
anyway.4 Or suppose that on a whim I killed my neighbor’s be-
loved kitten while my neighbors watch and, now that the wrong 
is done, they play soccer with the corpse. Or consider Christo-
pher Heath Wellman’s example:
Imagine, for instance, that your parents own slaves and 
therefore are able to provide a comfortable life for you. 
Among other things, they pay for your college tuition 
with the profits they garner from the slave labor. Should 
you accept this money from them? What would you 
think of a daughter of slave-owners who defended her 
privileged life by saying: “I agree that owning slaves is 
morally wrong, but that provides no reason to criticize 
me because I don’t own any slaves!” (2014, 424)
Lastly, there is Shafer-Landau’s own example:
There does, for instance, seem something morally re-
pugnant about a willingness to utilize or purchase soap 
made from the bodies of concentration camp victims. 
This is so even though one’s present refusal to use the 
soap could not contribute to any reduction of cruelty. 
(1994, 96)
In each case, it’s very clear that the performed actions consti-
tute participation in a purpose bound up in, or about, a wrong-
ful use of right-bearers, a participation in which is wrong.5 
What is minimally true of these cases is that the moral losses 
are not respected as moral losses.
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It should be fairly obvious from the example of the Corpse 
Review how all of this relates to eating or purchasing animal 
products. To make matters simple, let’s assume that the dis-
cussion of wrongness herein is strictly pro tanto and restricted 
to cases where animals were wrongly killed. Thus, while it 
might be sometimes permissible to consume or purchase ani-
mal products, there is a presumption against doing so in cases 
where the animal was wrongly killed or used.
Unjustly killing or using animals for food, we are supposing, 
violates their rights. Not only does it violate their rights, but 
killing or using animals for food is in a significant sense bound 
up in, or about, wrongfully killing or using animals. One par-
ticipates in this purpose by doing what the wrongdoers sought 
to do, namely, use the animals. When agents fail to treat moral 
losses as losses, they act wrongly.
One objection we might raise is that such a principle is too 
broad. After all, we are benefactors of numerous past wrongs 
such as slavery, broad colonialism, and genocide against Native 
Americans. Many of us likewise benefit from contemporary 
evils like government-sponsored torture, paternalistic wars, 
and weak child labor laws in foreign nations. Ought we there-
fore to renounce our citizenship in order to avoid benefitting 
from the aforementioned horrors?
There is cause for sympathy to this objection, but it is not 
obviously persuasive. Some benefits obtained through immoral 
means are such that foregoing them would be an unreasonable 
burden, whereas others would not. Consider a case where you 
are in need of a blood transfusion. You learn that the blood you 
will receive comes from an involuntary donor; that is, someone 
who did not consent to have her blood taken. In fact, she was 
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coerced into donating blood. Regrettably, this is the only blood 
available for your transfusion, and without the blood you will 
die (or, less strongly, you will faint or become ill). In a case like 
this, avoiding the immorally produced product places upon you 
a burden that is unreasonable to expect you to bear. We might 
compare this to the burden of immigrating to a foreign country 
or foregoing any and all income produced in a system built on 
the backs of slaves (i.e., virtually all one’s income).
Think now of a different case. Two blood bags are available 
to you and they differ in only one respect: one contains blood 
taken from a voluntary donor whereas the other contains blood 
taken from an involuntary donor. Your need for blood trans-
fusion is not so urgent that you lack the time or the ability to 
make an informed decision about which blood you will accept. 
In a case like this, where no harm will befall you if you opt for 
the blood taken via voluntary means, you should choose that 
blood rather than the blood taken via involuntary means. For at 
least most of us, this is an analog to many cases of purchasing 
meat or other animal products: We can, with very little effort, 
forego a host of animal products, such as meat and dairy and 
fur. Consequently, foregoing these products, if they are pro-
duced immorally, places no unreasonable burden upon us, and 
therefore the pro tanto obligation to avoid purchasing immor-
ally produced products stands.
III. An Interlude: Grounding?
Very plausibly, in almost none of these cases do you harm 
the victim. Those in the Corpse Review are dead; the kitten is 
dead; the concentration camp victims are dead. They therefore 
cannot be harmed and, on some accounts, they (as non-existent 
things) now lack rights altogether.6 After all, one might argue 
thusly:
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The ‘No Existence Means No Rights’ Argument
(1)  You have some right(s) only if you exist.
(2)  You do not exist.
 ∴  Therefore, you have no right(s).
This introduces a problem for the view I have defended here. 
But whereas no current right might explain the wrongness of 
using former right-bearers in this way, there are other ways of 
explaining it. 
First, some past right might have grounded a current duty to 
the (now-former) right-bearer’s wishes. Think of this in terms 
of a claim-right, or a right that entails an obligation for others. 
The entailment looks like this:
You have a claim-right against me to x → I am obli-
gated to x.7
Sometimes it is assumed that your claim-right uniquely 
grounds the entailed duty, such that if you no longer exist and 
thus no longer have a claim-right against me, then I lack any 
duty to you.8 But that might be challenged. Suppose I promise 
you that, after your death, I will see to it that no one disturbs 
your buried remains. In virtue of the promise, you now have a 
claim-right against me that I watch over your remains. Does 
my duty to watch over your remains end when you die and ef-
fectively lose all your rights? It seems not,9 but then although 
your claim-right entailed a duty, the duty is ‘free-standing’ in 
that it does not depend on whether you exist or, more to the 
point, whether you currently have any rights.
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Another possibility is that our obligation to treat moral loss-
es as moral losses derives not from previously existing rights 
of the right-bearers, but instead from a general moral require-
ment.10 Here, there are numerous candidates for grounding. The 
first and simplest candidate is that if some wrong occurred, 
then it is wrong (other things being equal) to celebrate, par-
ticipate in, or benefit from it. Meeting this requirement might 
differ across cases, but in those cases where a right-bearer was 
wronged by some purpose p, it would be pro tanto wrong to 
participate in p.
IV. The Second Argument: Rewarding Wrongdo-
ing
On commonsense moral views, there is a presumption 
against acting such that people would have made morally 
worthwhile sacrifices for nothing. As one popular expression 
has it, ‘They shouldn’t die for nothing!’ There is a similar prin-
ciple to support my thesis: We should (other things being equal) 
avoid acting in some way such that, if we acted in that way, the 
evil efforts of others would not be in vain. Said another way, 
we should actively frustrate the evil plans of others when we 
can reasonably do so. An obligatory respect for rights likewise 
entails refraining from rewarding prior rights violations and 
requesting further rights violations. Rights theory aside, it is 
clear that wrongdoing should not be rewarded.11
Imagine that a community wants Sawyer dead, and hit-man 
Hugo is ideally suited to conduct the assassination. Hugo is 
hired and kills Sawyer. The town’s citizens are pleased; they 
have what they want. The community, however, has not yet 
raised the funds to reimburse Hugo for his now-completed 
work. You overhear that countless citizens will donate tomor-
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row, and you know this to be true. Whether you donate or not, 
Hugo will be reimbursed for killing Sawyer. 
A contribution to the donation box cannot plausibly be con-
strued as a request to kill Sawyer, because that much has been 
done.12 However, it can be construed as a reward or reimburse-
ment to Hugo for killing Sawyer. Here, the donation box ex-
ists for the primarily (if not singular) purpose of reimbursing 
Hugo. Acting as a donor for such a fund is therefore to reward 
wrongdoing, in this case a rights-violating assassination. By 
analogy, purchasing animal products rewards/reimburses those 
who produce it, which is to reward immoral actions. But im-
moral actions should not be rewarded.
Three objections immediately arise. The first concerns the 
doctrine of double effect, according to which it is possible for 
a consumer of animal products to have merely foreseen but not 
intended to request or reward wrongdoing, but merely (say) to 
purchase food for one’s family. The second objection is that the 
causal chains of animal product production are so complex that 
it is implausible that wrongdoers are rewarded or that the con-
sumer of animal products requests further wrongdoing. After 
all, one might just as easily be rewarding those who ship the 
animal products or those in the accounting office, and they are 
not wrongdoers. Indeed, those who violate the animal’s rights 
by killing or using the animals may themselves not benefit fi-
nancially from you at all. The third objection is that appeals to 
“reasonable burdens” are so under-described that the argument 
against rewarding wrongdoing holds little weight. Call these 
objections the Double Effect Objection, the Complex Network 
Objection, and the Reasonable Burden Objection, respectively.
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Regarding the Double Effect Objection, there are two re-
plies, each of which is decisive. If it is my intention to acquire 
your car but not my intention to pay you for it, I nonetheless 
reward you for your car if I give you money. In order words, 
intending to reward is not a necessary condition for rewarding. 
Another consideration is that, in similar cases, we would not 
accept the double effect excuse; or, if we did, it would be un-
der circumstances where the countervailing costs of not eating 
wrongfully produced animal products would meet some high 
threshold. If I am grocery shopping and decide to purchase 
Soylent Green for my family, we would regard this as wrong 
unless I had some plausible justification. Therefore, double ef-
fect does not excuse those who purchase wrongfully produced 
animal products unless further and extreme special circum-
stances arise.13
Regarding the Complex Network Objection, there is again a 
decisive reply. Consider that in complex causal networks where 
source-identifiable resources are placed in a giant financial 
pot, those resources lose their source-identifiableness. In other 
words, if you place $100 in a financial network of rewards and 
the network distributes all contributions to various companies, 
agents, and so on, then your $100 (qua your $100) is no more 
this money over here than that money over there. On one view, 
this makes who or what you’re rewarding underdetermined: 
you aren’t rewarding anyone. On another view, your contribu-
tion is overdetermined: you’re rewarding everyone. Clearly, in 
such cases, we should favor the view that your contribution is 
overdetermined, and here’s why: if we didn’t, we could eas-
ily justify giving to terrorist groups and other evil causes if 
our contributions were part of a larger financial network where 
more than those groups are rewarded.
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In reply to the Reasonable Burden Objection, observe that 
my arguments appealing only to the intuitive idea that some 
burdens are reasonable to expect agents to bear, whereas others 
aren’t. Admittedly, the line is not always clear, but we often use 
it to make moral decisions. For example, it would be unreason-
able to expect my friend to be tortured for a thousand years in 
order to spare me the momentary and slight pain of a needle 
prick, but it wouldn’t be unreasonable to expect my friend to 
get his shoes wet to save me from drowning. Thus, talk of rea-
sonable and unreasonable burdens is itself neither strange nor 
unhelpful.
Nevertheless, some might object that a duty to refrain from 
using or consuming immorally produced animal products is an 
example of an unreasonable burden, since such products are 
ubiquitous. One reply is to point out that I have not said which 
animal products are immorally produced, and therefore my ar-
guments need not shoulder this burden unless it is shown that 
such products are ubiquitous. But such a reply would be unhelp-
ful to substantive animal welfare and animal rights views for 
which the Causal Impotence Objection is problematic. Thus, I 
offer a further reply.
Recall the blood donation analogy. If you are must select 
either “voluntary blood” or “involuntary blood” for your need-
ed transfusion, it seems initially clear that you should, other 
things being equal, choose the former. Things are not always 
equal, however. If you are seriously injured and must decide 
quickly to avoid risking further serious harm to yourself, it 
might be unreasonable to expect you to pay much attention to 
the differences (moral or otherwise) in the choices before you. 
Similarly, if a person has gone without food for some medi-
cally significant period of time, it might seem unreasonable to 
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expect them to choose a salad over a steak. Such desperation, 
however, is atypical for the vast majority of persons living in 
modern, industrial societies. We can avoid using or consum-
ing many animal products with ease, without worrying about 
severe hunger or other health necessities.
V. Conclusion
We began with the Causal Impotence Argument, which pur-
ports to show that eating or purchasing animal products makes 
no causal difference to the amount of animal suffering and 
death in the world. Thus, for ethical theories in which the cen-
tral or only moral consideration is whether or not one causes 
unnecessary suffering or death, consuming or purchasing ani-
mal products are either not very wrong or not at all wrong. 
Russ Shafer-Landau, one of the primary proponents of the 
Causal Impotence Argument, concedes that it might neverthe-
less be true that there are other, non-utilitarian wrong-making 
properties of eating or purchasing the products of animals. He 
considers several proposals and rejects them, while noting that 
there might be other proposals.
We then put forward a proposal in which respect for the loss 
of right-bearers, and respect for rights violations, entails treat-
ing those moral losses as moral losses. In particular, it entails at 
the very least not participating in processes or purposes which 
were about wrongfully ruining, ending, or using the lives of 
right-bearers. Where the purpose in question is a wrongful use 
of the right-bearer’s body, as in recreational cannibalism,14 con-
suming the bodily products constitutes participation in the evil 
process of using the right-bearer’s body. The same is true of 
eating or purchasing the products of animals who have been 
wronged.15
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Endnotes
1 For more on Singer’s views, see Singer (1974) and Singer (2006).
2 Engel’s appendix, which includes all of his utilized principles, can be 
found on p.888.
3 The problem is perhaps clearer and more pressing for utilitarians, given 
their emphasis on causal outcomes. Cf. Kagan. (2011), 107-108. For further 
problems regarding a utilitarian basis for vegetarianism, see Regan. (1980), 
305-324. See also Singer’s response in Singer (1980).
4 I am grateful to Bob Fischer for this example.
5 This argument bears some resemblance to a similar line of argument ad-
dressed by Jonathan Glover (1986), 138-140. Glover considers the Solzhe-
nistyn Principle, according to which it is wrong to permit some unavoidable 
evil to be done through oneself. Said another way: One should never permit 
oneself to be a ‘conduit’ of evil. The argument given here is a more finely-
grained variation on the Solzhenistyn Principle, showing why it’s imper-
missible to do this.
6 Shafer-Landau (1994, p.93) makes this move explicitly and raises it as 
problematic for deontologists.
7 I borrow here from the clear explication given by Rodin (2002), 17-21.
8 It can’t be reasonably claimed that such a view follows logically from the 
basic conception of claim-rights, because the following argument is invalid:
(1) If you have a claim-right against me to x, then I am obligated to x.
(2) You have no claim-right against me to x.
Therefore, I am not obligated to x.
9 Suggesting otherwise leaves one with two rather strange options. Either 
such duties can never get off the ground in the first place because they re-
quire it to be true that one is obligated to honor your wishes even after you 
lose all your rights; or that, somehow, it can be true that “I (pro tanto) ought 
to guard his remains after he dies” and false that “he died and I (pro tanto) 
ought to guard his remains.”
10 Perhaps, as Rossians might claim, it’s a pro tanto duty.
11 A utilitarian argument along these lines was developed by Engel (2000), 
860. According to Engel, “Unnecessary cruelty is wrong and prima facie 
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should not be supported or encouraged.” The same extends, presumably, 
to reward, which is a kind of support. In contrast to utilitarian objections 
to supporting and encouraging wrongful practices, where the presumed 
grounds of the wrongness is the effects such support or encouragement 
would have, the argument developed here assumes that it is wrong in itself 
to request or reward wrongdoing.
12 It could be so construed if, for example, you were unaware that Sawyer 
had already been killed, but in the thought experiment you are ex hypothesi 
aware of this fact.
13 On the Double Effect Objection, see Norcross (2004), 234.
14 I borrow the term from Irvine (1989), 13.
15 My thanks to Bob Fischer for comments on several early drafts of this 
paper, and to the Department of Philosophy at Bethel University in Saint 
Paul, Minnesota where this paper was invited and first presented.
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